Case 2:23-cv-07532-DMG-SSC		
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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
9 10	SANDRA KIRKMAN AND	CI OF CALIFORNIA Case No.: 2:23-cv-07532-DMG-SSC
11	CARLOS ALANIZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
12	SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST TO JOHN ALANIZ, DECEASED,	AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE BY
13	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANTS STATE OF CALIFORNIA BY AND THROUGH CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL
14	v.	AND OFFICER RAMON SILVA TO EXCLUDE INADMISSIBLE LAY
15 16	STATE OF CALIFORNIA; RAMON SILVA; AND DOES 1-10, INCLUSIVE.	OPINIONS AND IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICAL WITNESS VIDEO COMMENTARY
17	Defendant.	VIDEO COMMENTARI
18		[No. 1 of 4]
19		Courtroom: 8C
20		Judge: Hon. Dolly M. Gee
21		FPTC: March 25, 2025, 2:00 p.m. Trial Date: April 15, 2025, 8:30 a.m.
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23	INTRODUCTION	
24	This case arises out of the fatal shooting of John Alaniz by California	
25	Highway Patrol Officer Ramon Silva.	
26	CHP Officers Jonathan Van Dragt and Ramon Silva responded to the I-105	
27	freeway because John Alaniz was purposely trying to kill himself by jumping in	
28	front of cars. Upon contact with the officers, Alaniz ignored commands to remove	
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his hands from his pocket until he pulled objects from his pocket and immediately charged directly at the officers with his hands together and outstretched in front of him in the classic "shooter's stance." Reasonably believing Alaniz had a gun and was going to shoot (as anyone would), Silva responded with objectively reasonable deadly force. Alaniz was shot three times and died.

Defendants Silva and State of California move to preclude and exclude improper lay witness opinion and prejudicial and irrelevant commentary from cell phone videos plaintiffs intend to introduce, and further move to preclude and exclude any similar testimony of witness Emanuel Clark or any other lay witnesses.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff intends to call witness Emanuel Clark. He was not deposed so the content of his testimony is not yet known. But Clark did provide investigators cell phone video taking *after* the shooting occurred where he is heard making various statements. Plaintiffs have listed two of the videos as exhibits. This is what Clark says on the videos:

> Yo, bro. I'm in my work truck. I seen the whole shit. Yes, this man did run up with like a taser - some little bullshit. Nothing major. They killed this man though. They could 've used the taser. They could have did anything they wanted to keep this man alive. They fucking killed this man. Bro, you're still going to put his hands behind his back! He's fucking dead! Bro he's dead! He's dead!

> "N****, they just killed this n****. Oh. They just killed this dude. Oh my God, they just killed this n*****. Bro, they just killed him. Bro, they just killed him. Bro, they just killed him."

> Bro, you guys are going to handcuff a dead guy. He's dead. He's dead. You're handcuffing a dead guy. Hey, hey, excuse me mam' He's dead. They killed him already. Mam', I sat here and watched it. I watched it live. What are they doing. Oh my God."

Although the statement "Yo, bro. I'm in my work truck. I seen the whole shit. Yes, this man did run up with like a taser," is admissible because it is based on his personal observations, Fed. R. Evid, 601, none of the other opinions or commentary is admissible.

The statements from the video, or any similar trial testimony, that "[t]hey could 've used the taser" and "[t]hey could have did anything they wanted to keep this man alive" are inadmissible lay witness opinions on ultimate issues concerning the reasonableness of lethal force or tactics employed regarding the use of force. Fed. R. Evidence 701(c) (lay witness opinion testimony cannot be expert testimony); *see Tan v. City & Cty. of S.F.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24668, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2010) (precluding lay witness from testifying that "force used by Defendants was excessive, unreasonable, or greater than necessary", including testimony "that she thought the officers were doing a lot more to Remi Tan than he was doing in return; that is, the officers were using force when the arrestee was not.").

The same is true for the statements impugning the officers for handcuffing Alaniz because the propriety of handcuffing in that situation is a matter of police practices and beyond common knowledge. Statements about the handcuffing are also inadmissible because they are irrelevant. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402. Silva did not handcuff Alaniz. Even if he did, conduct after the use of deadly force has no bearing on any issue in this case.

Statements or testimony regarding how the officers "killed" Alaniz are not helpful to the jury because it is undisputed that Silva killed Alaniz. Also, the entire emotional tenor of the statements and purported outrage is prejudicial. Fed. R. Evid. 403.

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